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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-MEDICAL

MARIJUANA

AND

THE

MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THE AFTERMATH OF UNITED
STATES V. OAKLAND CANNABIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE

"[T]here are some limited circumstances in which we recommend
smoking marijuana for medical uses."
-National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, Con
clusion to the Report funded by the White House Drug Policy
Office. March 17, 1999.
INTRODUCTION

In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215 ("Prop
215"),1 which authorized physicians to "recommend" the use of ma
rijuana for the treatment of a variety of maladies. 2 As a result, vari
ous groups3 organized for the purpose of providing marijuana to
qualified individuals. 4 In 1998, the United States sued one of these
groups, Cannabis Cultivators Club, in an attempt to stop the distri
bution of marijuana that had started as a result of Prop 215. 5 The
case eventually worked its way to the United States Supreme Court
where, in May 2001, the Court issued a decision. 6 United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("OCBC") highlighted the
differences among the Supreme Court Justices regarding the con
troversial topic of the legality of marijuana use for medical pur
poses. In OCBC, an eight-Justice Court, with Justice Breyer
abstaining,7 uniformly agreed that the common law defense of ne
cessity was inapplicable to the manufacture or distribution of mari
1. Proposition 215, Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (codified at CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1362.5 (West 2002». See also infra note 68.
2. Id. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (identifing specifically a number
of these maladies).
3. Examples include: Cannabis Cultivators Club, Marin Alliance for Medical Ma
rijuana, Ukiah Cannabis Buyers Club, Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative, Flower
Therapy Medical Marijuana Club, and Santa Cruz Cannabis Buyers Club. United
States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
4. Id. at 1092.
5. Id.
6. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
7. Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration and decision of DCBC be
cause his brother, Judge Charles R. Breyer, presided over United States v. Cannabis
Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998), the district court case that even
tually led to DCBe.
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juana for medical purposes. However, in the concurring opinion,
written by Justice Stevens, three Justices disagreed with the major
ity's suggestion that the medical necessity defense was equally inap
plicable to use and possession violations of the Controlled
Substances Act ("CSA")8 for medical purposes.
This Note advances the proposition that there is a legal distinc
tion between the distribution or manufacture of marijuana and its
use or possession in violation of the CSA, and that the medical ne
cessity defense should be available to a seriously ill person who uses
or possesses marijuana for medical purposes. The basis for this pro
position is that such result is consistent with long-standing legal
doctrines and a contrary conclusion would be in conflict with those
doctrines. Additionally, this proposition is not in conflict with the
Supreme Court's holding in DeBe.
Part I of this Note presents a brief summary of the historical
use of marijuana for medical purposes and of the federal govern
ment's regulation of marijuana in the United States, ultimately
leading to the CSA. Part I then reviews the origins of the CSA, the
role that scheduling, or drug classification, plays in drug control pol
icy, and the history of one particular effort to reschedule marijuana
so that it could be legally prescribed by physicians.
Part II discusses and examines the majority and concurring
opinions of DeBe. Finally, Part III proposes that the defense of
medical necessity should be available in cases dealing with the use
and possession of marijuana for medical purposes, and explores the
substantive divergence between the majority and concurring opin
ions in DeBe. The analysis centers on three doctrines that could
each independently form the basis for allowing a medical necessity
defense in cases of medical use of marijuana by seriously ill persons.
The Note argues that, in the context of the availability of the medi
cal necessity defense, there is a distinction between the legal treat
ment of distribution or manufacture of medical marijuana and the
legal treatment of its use or possession. This distinction is identified
through the analysis of (1) the traditional availability and use of the
defense of necessity, (2) the relevance and applicability of equitable
jurisdiction, and (3) the doctrine of federalism. In the process, Part
III summarizes the development and application of the necessity
defense, the historical function and scope of courts of equity, the
8.

The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.c.

§§ 801-971 (2000).
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relevance of the right to pain relief, and the federalist function of
preserving a dual syst~m of government in the United States.
The Note concludes that the medical necessity defense should
be available to a seriously ill person who uses or possesses mari
juana for medical purposes. Such a conclusion is consistent with the
aforementioned doctrines, and a contrary conclusion would be in
conflict not only with those doctrines, but also with prior Supreme
Court decisions relating to these doctrines.
I.

A.

HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA

Pre-1970 Medical Use of Marijuana

The plant known as marijuana has been used as medicine for at
least 5000 years.9 The world's oldest surviving text on medical
drugs, the Chinese Shen-nung Pen-tshao Ching, specifically cites
marijuana's ability to reduce the pain of rheumatism and treat di
gestive disorders.!o Marijuana has been cultivated in the United
States for its fiber content for over 400 years.!1 According to some
historians, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson cultivated
marijuana and advocated a hemp-based economy.12 Regarding ma
rijuana's medicinal qualities, between 1840 and 1900, European and
American medical journals published more than 100 articles on the
therapeutic benefits of marijuana,13 and the drug was routinely pre
scribed until the beginning of its regulation in the 1930's.14 Mari
juana remained in the United States' pharmacopoeia until the
passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1941,15 after which physicians
were greatly hampered in their ability to prescribe it as a
medicine. 16 The American Medical Association was one of the
most vocal organizations to testify against the regulation, which ef
9. LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D. & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBID·
DEN MEDICINE 3 (rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter "GRINSPOON & BAKALAR"].
10. B. ZIMMERMAN ET AL., Is MARIJUANA THE RIGHT MEDICINE FOR You? A
FACTUAL GUIDE TO MEDICAL USES OF MARIJUANA (1998).
11. NORML, NORML REPORT ON SIXTY YEARS OF MARIJUANA PROHIBITION
IN THE U.S. (Mar. 17,2002), at http://www.norrnl.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID=4428.
12. JOHN ROULAC, INDUSTRIAL HEMP: PRACTICAL PRODUCTS-PAPER TO
FABRIC TO COSMETICS 8 (1995).
13. Lester Grinspoon, M.D. & James B. Bakalar, Marijuana as a Medicine: A
Plea for Reconsideration, 273 JAMA 1875 (1995) (discussing historical and modern
medical uses for marijuana).
14. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REpORT ON MARIJUANA AND
HEALTH 85 (1971).
15. NORML, MEDICAL USE, at http://www.norrnl.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID=
5441 (last updated Mar. 10, 2003).

16.

Id.
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fectively acted as a ban, arguing that the regulatory scheme would
deprive patients of a safe and effective medicineP The recrea
tional use of drugs, including marijuana, increased during the
1960's. As a result of growing legislative concern over the increased
use of all drugs for recreation, Congress enacted the CSA in 1970.
B.

The Controlled Substances Act

In enacting the CSA, Congress' stated objectives were the uni
fication of law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of drug enforce
ment efforts inside and outside the United States, compliance with
the 1961 International Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 18
("Single Convention") through the application of the Single Con
vention's norms and practices, and the adoption of a legal structure
that affords law enforcement the flexibility necessary to adapt to
future changes in the drug culture.1 9
1.

Scheduling: The Classification of Drugs

As a structural component of the CSA, Congress generated a
classification scheme whereby each drug was classified into a cate
gory called a "schedule. "20 Congress placed drugs into different
schedules on the basis of predetermined factors.21 Additionally, as
a means of ensuring the CSA's adaptation to future demands, Con
gress built into the CSA a mechanism for the rescheduling of drugs,
17. American Medical Association Legislative Counsel William C. Woodword
testified before Congress on July 12, 1937, against the Marijuana Tax Act. He stated:
We cannot understand ... why this bill should have been prepared in secret
for two years without any initiative, even to the profession, that it was being
prepared. . .. The obvious purpose and effect of this bill is to impose so many
restrictions on the medical use [of marijuana] as to prevent such use altogether
. . .. It may serve to deprive the public of the benefits of a drug that on further
research may prove to be of substantial benefit.
Id.
18. The International Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a treaty signed
by members of the United Nations establishing several classifications, or schedules, of
substances. Parties to the Single Convention are required to limit production, distribu
tion, and possession of classified drugs to authorized medical and scientific purposes; to
license and control all persons engaged in the manufacture or distribution of the drugs;
and to prepare detailed estimates of national drug requirements. See Nat'! Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) V. Drug Enforcement Admin. (DEA), 559 F.2d
735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
19. See generally 21 U.S.c. § 801 (Congressional Findings) (2000); ROBERT L.
BOGOMOLNY ET AL., A HANDBOOK ON THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG Acr: SHIFTING THE
PERSPEcrIVE 5, 63-65 (1975).
20. 21 U.S.c. §§ 811, 812 (2000).
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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if and when it became necessary due to new findings or changing
circumstances. 22
The CSA partitioned psychoactive drugs into five schedules ac
cording to their abuse potential, known effect, harmfulness to an
individual and to society at large, and level of accepted medical
use. 23 Schedule I drugs, which include substances such as heroin,
LSD, and marijuana, are defined as drugs with "a high potential for
abuse,24 . . . no currently-accepted medical use in the United
States[, and] a lack of accepted safety for use of the substance
under medical supervision."25 Physicians cannot prescribe drugs
placed into Schedule J.26
Schedule II drugs, like Schedule I drugs, are defined as having
a high potential for abuse.2 7 However, unlike Schedule I drugs,
these drugs have a currently accepted medical use and, therefore,
are available to patients through a physician's prescription. 28
Schedule II drugs include morphine, cocaine, amphetamines, and
PCP.29 The remaining schedules, Schedules III, IV, and V, relax
the restrictions on the included drugs based on known dangers asso
ciated with their use and the medical and/or societal value of the
respective substances. 3o
Evidence suggests that Congress intended to place marijuana
in Schedule I only temporarily, anticipating a possible change in
marijuana's Schedule I status after studies yielded more concrete
facts regarding marijuana's characteristics and effects.31 Accord
ingly, when the CSA was enacted, Congress deferred its full consid
eration of the medical use of marijuana pending the outcome of
studies commissioned by the Presidential Commission on Mari
juana and Drug Use. 32 In 1972, the Commission's findings noted
22. 21 U.S.C § 812 (2000) (establishing procedures for the rescheduling of
substances).
23. Id. § 812(b)(1) (listing findings required for Schedule I substances).
24. 21 CF.R. § 1308.11 (2002) (listing current Schedule I drugs).
25. 21 U.S.C § 812(b).
26. Id.; see also id. § 829 (1997) (specifying how drugs in Schedules II-V may be
dispensed and prescribed for medical use).
27. Id. § 812(b)(2).
28. !d. § 829(a) (making Schedule II drugs available through a written, non-refill
able prescription).
29. 21 CF.R. § 1308.12.
30. 21 U.S.C § 812(b)(3)-(b)(5); 21 CF.R. § 1308.12-1308.15 (identifying the va
rious categories and bases for classification).
31. RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, II, THE MARIJUANA CON·
VIcrION 246-47 (photo. reprint 1988) (1974).
32. See id. at 247. The Committee Report on the House Bill regarding reschedul
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marijuana lacked dangerousness and recommended dramatic re
ductions in the legal penalties associated with it. 33
2.

Efforts to Reschedule Marijuana

One of the CSA's goals was to establish flexible drug schedules
that could be modified when the circumstances so dictated. 34 In
deed, Congress included specific statutory criteria in the CSA's text
to govern the rescheduling process when it became necessary.35
CSA gave the authority to examine substances and reschedule them
to the Attorney General, who, prior to any determination, was re
quired to seek medical and scientific evaluations from the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW").36 The Secretary of
HEW, in turn, was required to make a recommendation regarding
the proper scheduling of the particular drug. 37 The Attorney Gen
eral delegated his authority to examine and reschedule all drugs to
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ("BNDD"), the
predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA").38
In 1972, the National Organization for the Reform of Mari
juana Laws ("NORML")39 and other groups40 filed a petition re
questing the rescheduling of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule
ing recommended" 'that marijuana be retained in Schedule I at least until the comple
tion of studies now underway.' ... The recommendations of this Commission will be of
aid in determining the appropriate disposition of this question in the future." H.R.
REP. No. 91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4579 (quoting letter from
Roger O. Egeberg, M.D. to Hon. Harley O. Staggers (Aug. 14, 1970), in H.R. REP. No.
91-1444, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4629), quoted in BONNIE & WHITE.
BREAD, supra note 31, at 247. Raymond Shafer, a former Republican Governor of
Pennsylvania was selected by President Nixon to head the Commission. BONNIE &
WHITEBREAD, supra note 31, at 256.
33. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 31, at 270-73 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON
MARIJUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL FOR MISUNDERSTANDING 145
54 (1972), available at http://www.druglibrary.orglschafferllibrary/studies/nc/ncmenu.
htm). The Report noted that marijuana was demonized because it symbolized the
"counterculture," not because it had any negative physiological effects.
34. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 13, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573,4579.
35. [d.; 21 U.S.C § 811(c) (2000).
36. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, at 13, reprinted in 1970 U.S.CCA.N. 4573, 4579; 21
U.S.C § 811(a)-(b).
37. 21 U.S.C § 811(b).
38. 28 C.F.R. § 0.100-0.104 (2000) (outlining regulatory functions of the DEA).
The BNDD became the DEA in 1973.
39. Since its founding in 1970, NORML has provided "a voice in the public policy
debate for those Americans who oppose marijuana prohibition and favor an end to the
practice of arresting marijuana smokers. A non-profit public-interest advocacy group,
NORML represents the interests of the tens of millions of Americans who smoke mari
juana responsibly." NORML, ABOUT NORML, at http://www.norml.orglindex.cfm?
Group_ID=3379 (last updated Apr. 15, 2003).
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V.41 NORML's petition was denied by the BNDD on grounds that
the Single Convention barred the rescheduling,42 and the petition
ers appealed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that BNDD's decision was inconsis
tent with the administrative process required by the CSA for
rescheduling, which called for a finding on the merits.43 On re
mand, in 1975, Administrative Law Judge Lewis Parker declared
that the Single Convention did allow for the rescheduling of mari
juana and suggested that the proper course of action was to hold
rescheduling hearings as called for in the CSA.44 The DEA's acting
Administrator, however, ignored AU Parker's suggestion and en
tered a final order denying the petition "in all respects. "45 After
the petitioners again appealed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded, directing the DEA to refer the petition to the Secretary
of HEW for an independent scientific evaluation and to comply
with the requirements of the CSA.46 In 1979, the Secretary of
HEW recommended that marijuana remain in Schedule I, and the
DEA issued a final order denying the rescheduling petition without
holding hearings on the matter. 47
For a third time, the petitioners appealed, and the case was
again remanded to the DEA for a full reconsideration of the issues.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the DEA to carry out a
full scientific evaluation and rescheduling recommendation. As a
result, rescheduling hearings were held in 1986 before Administra
tive Law Judge Francis Young. The issues before AU Young were
whether the marijuana plant had a currently accepted medical use
for treatment in the United States and whether there was an ac
40. See supra note 3 (identifying groups organized for the purpose of providing
medical marijuana to qualified persons).
41. NORML v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NORML v. DEA, 559
F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
42. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 750-57 (articulating the reason why reschedul
ing was barred by the Single Convention).
43. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d at 659-60.
44. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 742. AU Parker found that the Single Conven
tion allowed for the rescheduling of cannabis or cannabis resin to CSA Schedule II and
cannabis leaves to Schedule V. Id.
45. Marihuana Scheduling, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,164, 44,168 (Sept. 25, 1975)
(determination).
46. NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d at 757. See also 21 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812 (2000) for
CSA requirements (requiring the DEA to seek medical and scientific evaluations from
the Secretary of HEW, who then makes a recommendation to the DEA as to the
proper scheduling of the drug evaluated).
47. Marihuana and Synthetic THC, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,123 (June 20, 1979) (final
administrative order) .

.,;" .
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cepted safety for the use of the marijuana plant under medical su
pervision. 48 Based on the evidence presented, ALl Young found
that marijuana had accepted medical uses 49 and that there existed
safety for marijuana use under medical supervision. 50 Though ALl
Young recommended that the DEA reschedule marijuana as a
schedule II drug,51 the DEA disagreed with ALl Young's interpre
tation of the phrase "currently accepted medical use," arguing that
such accepted use required more than a minority of professionals
and scholars. 52 The DEA then applied a self-developed eight-fac
tor test 53 to determine whether a substance had a "current accepted
medical value," and found that marijuana did not meet the
criteria.54
For a fourth time, the petitioners appealed and, once again, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case. In so doing, the
court found that the eight-factor test developed by the DEA,
though "in the main acceptable," contained several factors impossi
ble to comply with.55 For example, one of the factors required gen
48. In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Sept. 6, 1988) (Opinion
and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision of
A.L.I. Francis L. Young), available at http://www.druglibrary.orgiolsenIMEDICALI
YoungIYoung1.h tm!.
49. Id. at 68. AU Young found that marijuana had accepted medical uses in the
treatment of multiple sclerosis, spasticity, and hyperarathyroidism. Id. at 40-55. Addi
tionally, regarding marijuana's use to treat cancer, AU Young held:
[I]t is clear beyond any question that many people find marijuana to have, in
the words of the [CSA], an "accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States" in affecting relief for cancer patients. Oncologists, physicians treating
cancer patients accept this. Other medical practitioners and researchers ac
cept this. Medical faculty professors accept this. Nurses performing hands-on
patient care accept it. Patients accept it.
Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 66.
51. Id. at 66-68.
52. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
53. /d. (stating the eight factors used by the DEA: (1) scientifically determined
and accepted knowledge of its chemistry; (2) toxicology and pharmacology of the sub
stance in animals; (3)establishment of its effectiveness in humans through scientifically
designed clinical trials; (4) general availability of the substance and information regard
ing the substance and its use; (5) recognition of its clinical use in generally accepted
pharmacopoeia, medical references, journals, or textbooks; (6) specific indications for
the treatment of recognized disorders; (7) recognition of the use of the substance by
organizations or associations of physicians; and (8) recognition and use of the substance
by a substantial segment of the medical practitioners in the United States).
54. Schedules of Controlled Substances, 53 Fed. Reg. 5156 (Feb. 22, 1998) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1308).
55. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930 F.2d at 937, 941.
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eral use and acceptance of a substance before the substance could
be found to have an accepted medical value, even though Schedule
I expressly prevented such use. 56 The DEA subsequently elimi
nated its eight-factor test and replaced it with a new five-factor
test,57 again of its own fabrication. Based on this new test, the
DEA issued a final order denying the rescheduling petition. 58
The petitioners appealed a fifth time, objecting to inappropri
ate evidentiary standards and alleging bias by the DEA.59 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
that the petitioners were not prejudiced by the evidentiary stan
dards and that the DEA's findings were supported by "substantial
evidence."6o Accordingly, the petition for review was denied and
the rescheduling effort came to a close, twenty-two years after it
was initially filed. 61
Despite NORML and the other petitioners' unsuccessful at
tempts at rescheduling marijuana, the continued demand for medi
cal marijuana by patients and physicians throughout the United
States persuaded the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") in
1976 to approve the medicinal use of marijuana on a restricted ba
SiS. 62 This was accomplished through the implementation of the In
dividual Treatment Investigational New Drug Program (or
Compassionate Use IND Program) ["IND Program"],63 under
which physicians could obtain special authority to administer mari
juana to patients. 64 Although the IND Program at its peak enrolled
56. Id.
57. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (stating the five factors used by the DEA to determine the meaning of "currently
accepted medical use: (1) [t]he drug's chemistry must be known and reproducible; (2)
[t]here must be adequate safety studies; (3) [t]here must be adequate and well-con
trolled studies proving efficacy; (4) [t]he drug must be accepted by qualified experts;
and (5) [t]he scientific evidence must be widely available." (quoting Notice of Denial of
Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499, 10,506 (Mar. 26, 1992».
58. See 57 Fed. Reg. at 10,506.
59. The petitioners pointed to the long history of DEA anti-marijuana prejudice,
as evidenced by the court's need to remand on four prior occasions and the DEA Ad
ministrator's refusal to follow previous recommendations for the rescheduling of mari
juana, as well as comments by the Administrator minimizing the value of statements by
persons claiming to benefit from marijuana use. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 15
F.3d at 1136-37.
60. Id. at 1137 (stating that the Administrator had supplied expert testimony that
"marijuana's medicinal value has never been proven in sound scientific studies").
61. Id. at 1133.
62. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 20-21.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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as many as seventy-eight patients nationwide, it was closed to all
new applicants in 1992, in an effort to prevent it from being overrun
with AIDS patients requesting access to medical marijuana sup
plies. 65 Today the IND Program remains in operation for only
seven surviving, previously-approved patients. 66

II.
A.

UNITED STATES

v.

OAKLAND CANNABIS
BUYERS' COOPERATIVE67

Facts and Procedural History

When California voters enacted Prop 215 in November of
1996, the purpose of the initiative measure was to ensure that seri
ously ill Californians had the right to obtain and use marijuana for
medical purposes. 68 Prop 215 created an exception to California
65. ALLIANCE FOR CANNABIS THERAPEUTICS, MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE FAQ,
at http://www.marijuana·as·medicine.orglAlliance/faq.htm [hereinafter MARIJUANA AS
MEDICINE FAQ]
The Compassionate IND Program was closed because too many people were
asking for access to medical marijuana supplies. In order for marijuana to be
classified as a prohibited schedule I drug, it must not have "accepted medical
use in treatment" in the United States. The federal government knew that
hundreds (or thousands) of approved Compassionate IND recipients would
quickly undermine that criteria and marijuana would have to be rescheduled.
Rather than face this possibility, the federal government closed the Compas
sionate IND Program for marijuana.
Id.; see also Coalition for Compassionate Access Web site, at http://www.compassionate
access.orglbackground.html.
66. MARIJUANA AS MEDICINE FAQ, supra note 65.
67. 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
68. Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, states as its purpose:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate
and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the per
son's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of can
cer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or
any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
(B) To ensure that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes upon a recommendation of a physician are not
subject to criminal prosecution or sanction.
(C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to
provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in
medical need of marijuana.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibit
ing persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone
the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, no physician in this state
shall be punished or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended
marijuana to a patient for medical purposes.
(d) Section 11357 [of the California Code], relating to the possession of mari
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laws that prohibited the cultivation and possession of marijuana. 69
This exception allowed patients and their primary caregivers, with a
doctor's prescription, to possess or cultivate marijuana for the pur
pose of treating the patients' medical maladies. Such individuals
were to be exempt from the prohibitions on the use and cultivation
of marijuana imposed upon the population at large.
After Prop 215 was enacted into law, several groups organized
dispensaries of medical cannabis to meet the needs of qualified pa
tients.7° In January 1998, the United States sued one of these
groups, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative ("Coopera
tive"), a not-for-profit dispensary of marijuana. The United States
brought suit seeking to "enjoin the Cooperative from distributing
and manufacturing marijuana ... [because] whether or not the Co
operative's activities are legal under California law, they violate
federal law ... [s]pecifically ... the [CSA]."71 The district court
judge, Charles R. Breyer,72 granted a preliminary injunction.73 The
Cooperative did not appeal the injunction and openly violated it by
continuing to distribute marijuana. 74 To end the Cooperative's con
tinuing violation of the injunction, the United States initiated con
tempt proceedings.75 The Cooperative claimed that its distribution
of marijuana was medically necessary because marijuana was the
only drug that could alleviate the severe pain and other debilitating
symptoms of its patients and motioned for a dismissal or a medical
necessity modification to the injunction.76
juana, and Section 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not
apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or culti
vates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the
written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.
CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2(02).
69. § 13362.5(d).
70. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D.
Cal. 1998).
71. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 487.
72. Charles R. Breyer is Supreme Court Justice Breyer's brother. For this reason,
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration and decision of aCBC when it was
before the Supreme Court. Id. at 485.
73. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. The district
court granted the government's request for an injunction that prohibited possession of
marijuana with the intent to manufacture or distribute in addition to the distribution
and manufacturing of marijuana. The Supreme Court, for simplicity, referred to both
activities collectively as distributing and manufacturing marijuana. See aCBC, 532 U.S.
at 487, n.1.
74. aCBe, 532 U.S. at 487.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 488.
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Judge Breyer denied the Cooperative's motion to dismiss, de
nied the Cooperative's motion to modify the injunction, and found
the Cooperative in contempt.77 Judge Breyer, in rejecting the mo
tion to dismiss and the medical necessity defense, reiterated the
standard necessary to assert the common law defense of necessity
established in United States v. Aguilar: 78
[Defendant must prove] (1) that he was faced with a choice of
evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent immi
nent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a direct causal rela
tionship between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4)
that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law,?9

The district court determined that there was insufficient evi
dence to show that each recipient of marijuana was in actual danger
of imminent harm without the drug 80 and modified the preliminary
injunction to empower the U.S. Marshall to seize the Cooperative's
premises. 81 Although recognizing that "human suffering" could re
sult, the district court concluded that a court's "equitable powers
[do] not permit it to ignore federal law."82 Three days later, the
district court also rejected a motion by the Cooperative to modify
the injunction to permit distributions that were medically
necessary.83
The Cooperative appealed the contempt order and the denial
of its motion to modify, but before the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap
peals decided the case, the Cooperative voluntarily purged its con
tempt by promising compliance with the initial preliminary
injunction, thereby rendering the appeal of the contempt order
moot. 84 However, the denial of its motion to modify the injunction
remained an open issue, and the Ninth Circuit, holding 3-0 that the
medical necessity defense was a legally cognizable defense, re
versed and remanded with instructions to consider criteria for a
medical necessity exception to the CSA's prohibitions. 85
Id.
883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1102.
OCBC, 532 U.S. at 487.
/d. at 488.
Id.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1112-13
1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
85. /d. at 1114-15 (stating that because the district court had erroneously "be
lieved that it had no discretion to issue an injunction that was more limited in scope
than the Controlled Substances Act itself, it summarily denied the requested modifica
77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
(9th Cir.
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Accordingly, on July 17, 2000, the district court granted the Co
operative's motion to modify the injunction to incorporate the med
ical necessity defense. 86 Thereafter, the United States filed a
petition for certiorari,87 which was granted by the Supreme Court
"because the decision raises significant questions as to the ability of
the United States to enforce the Nation's drug laws."88
B.

Holding and Reasoning of the Supreme Court

In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken
nedy joined, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals and held that the medical necessity defense "is not a
defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana. "89 Justice
Stevens filed a concurring opinion90 in which Justices Souter and
Ginsburg joined.
The Supreme Court stated that the CSA allowed an exception
to the prohibition on intentionally manufacturing, distributing, or
tion [to the injunction] without weighing or considering the public interest"). The
Ninth Circuit also stated that because district courts retain "broad equitable discretion"
to fashion injunctive relief, the district court could have, and should have, weighed the
public interest and considered factors such as the serious harm in depriving patients of
marijuana. Id. at 1114.
86. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 2000 WL 1517166 (N.D.
Cal.). The district court modified the May 19, 1998, injunction as follows:
The foregoing injunction does not apply to the distribution of cannabis by
[OCBC] to patient-members who (1) suffer from a serious medical condition,
(2) will suffer imminent harm if the patient-member does not have access to
cannabis, (3) need cannabis for the treatment of the patient-member's medical
condition, or need cannabis to alleviate the medical condition or symptoms
associated with the medical condition, and (4) have no reasonable legal alter
native to cannabis for the effective treatment or alleviation of the patient
member's legal medical condition or symptoms associated with the medical
condition because the patient-member has tried all other legal alternatives to
cannabis and the alternatives have been ineffective in treating or alleviating
the patient-member's medical condition or symptoms associated with the med
ical condition, or the alternatives result in side effects which the patient-mem
ber cannot reasonably tolerate.
Id. at *1.
87. Note that it was the George W. Bush Administration that appealed the case
to the Supreme Court, an action contrary to President Bush's public support for states'
rights in the area of medical marijuana. "I believe each state can choose that decision
as they so choose." Susan Feeny, Bush Backs States' Rights on Marijuana: He Opposes
Medical Use But Favors Local Control, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 1999 (quot
ing President George W. Bush).
88. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 489.
89. Id. at 494.
90. See infra Part II.C. (discussing the concurrence).
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dispensing a Schedule I controlled substance only for
"[g]overnment-approved research projects."91 The Court rejected
the Cooperative's assertion that 21 U.S.C. § 841{a)92 of the CSA is
subject to "additional, implied exceptions"93 which should be read
into the CSA,94 one of which, the Cooperative claimed, is the com
mon law defense of necessity.95
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court noted that "it is an
open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recog
nize a necessity defense not provided by statute."96 However, the
Court stated that, in this case, it did not need to decide that particu
lar question and that it needed only to recognize that the terms of
the CSA were specifically inconsistent with any medical exception
for marijuana. 97 The Court further stated that, regarding the neces
sity defense, "one principle is clear: The defense cannot succeed
when the legislature itself has made a 'determination of values> "98
The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred when it
recognized the medical necessity defense as a "legally cognizable
91. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490 ("providing procedures for becoming a governmentapproved research project" (citing 21 U.S.c. § 823(f))).
92. 21 U.S.c. § 841(a) (2000) states:
(a) Unlawful acts
Except as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful for any person know
ingly or intentionally
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to man
ufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or
dispense, a counterfeit substance.
93. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490.
94. Id.
95. Although the defense was not before the Supreme Court and Justice Thomas
overlooked it in his statement that the CSA contains no exceptions except for research,
the fact is that § 885 of the CSA creates a broad exception for state or local officials
engaged in activities relating to controlled substances as properly authorized by state or
municipal law. See 21 U.S.c. § 885( d) (stating "no civil or criminal liability shall be
imposed by virtue of this title upon any duly authorized ... officer of any State, terri
tory, [or] political subdivision thereof ... who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforce
ment of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled substances"). The issue
then arises of what would result following the passage by a state of a law authorizing
state agencies or individuals to produce and distribute medical marijuana, or state doc
tors to prescribe and furnish it. Technically in these circumstances, such state agencies
or individuals would be immune from federal prosecution for CSA violations as per
§ 885.
96. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490.
97. Id. at 491.
98. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW 629 (2d ed. 1986)).
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defense"99 and when it remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to consider "the criteria for a medical necessity exemp
tion."loo The Supreme Court also found that, although district
courts have discretion in fashioning injunctive relief, the Court of
Appeals erred in stating the factors that district courts may consider
when exercising this discretion. lOl The Supreme Court warned that
the exercise of discretion by the district courts does not include
"ignor[ing] the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in leg
islation,"102 and that Congress had expressed precisely such deliber
ate judgment in the CSA.103

C.

The "Dissenting Concurrence"

Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Souter and Ginsburg
joined, issued a concurring opinion that, in many ways, read like a
dissent. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority opinion be
cause he agreed that a distributor of marijuana does not have a
medical necessity defense under the CSA. Justice Stevens did not
join in the majority'S dicta, however, which extended the holding
beyond manufacturing and distribution to possession and use. 104
99. Id. at 495 (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190
F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)).
100. Id. (quoting DCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115).
101. Id. at 498-99.
[T]he Court of Appeals erred by considering relevant the evidence that some
people have "serious medical conditions for whom the use of cannabis is nec
essary in order to treat or alleviate those conditions or their symptoms," that
these people "will suffer serious harm if they are denied cannabis," and that
"there is no legal alternative to cannabis for the effective treatment of their
medical conditions."
Id. (quoting DCBC, 190 F.3d at 1115).
102. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 497 (citing Virginian R. Co. v. Railway Employees, 300
U.S. 515, 551 (1937)).
103. !d. at 1722 (stating that "in the [CSA], the balance already has been struck
against a medical necessity exception."). See also id. at 491:
In the case of the [CSA], the statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no
medical benefits worthy of an exception ... Whereas some other drugs can be dis
pensed and prescribed for medical use ... the same is not true for marijuana. Indeed,
for purposes of the [CSA], marijuana has 'no currently accepted medical use' at all.
104. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated:
This confined holding is consistent with our grant of certiorari, which was lim
ited to the question '[w]hether the [CSA] forecloses a medical necessity de
fense to the [CSA]'s prohibition against manufacturing and distributing
marijuana ....
Accordingly ... respondents have raised the medical necessity defense as
a justification for distributing marijuana ... and it was in that context that the
Ninth Circuit determined that respondents had 'a legally cognizable defense.'
... [This] court is surely correct to reverse that determination....
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Justice Stevens characterized the majority's dicta in this respect as
"unwarranted and unfortunate excursions" from the case's "limited
holding."lo5 Specifically, Justice Stevens disagreed with the major
ity opinion in three ways.
First, Justice Stevens found it inappropriate for the Court in
this case to decide "whether the [medical necessity] defense might
be available to a seriously ill patient for whom there is no alterna
tive means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering."106
Justice Stevens asserted that the majority should, instead, have lim
ited its finding to the facts and issue of the case, that is, to the
CSA's applicability to a defendant charged with manufacturing and
distributing marijuana. 107
Second, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's casting
doubt upon the availability of the necessity defense in cases of less
than-explicit statutory authority. In response to the majority's
statement that "it is an open question whether federal courts ever
have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by
statute,"108 Justice Stevens stated that "our precedent has expressed
no doubt about the viability of the common-law defense [of neces
sity], even in the context of federal criminal statutes that do not
provide for it in so many words. "109
Third, Justice Stevens expressed disagreement with the way the
Apart from its holding, [this] Court takes two unwarranted and unfortu
nate excursions that prevent me from joining in [the majority] opinion. First,
the court reaches beyond its holding, and beyond the facts of the case, by
suggesting that the defense of necessity is unavailable for anyone under the
[CSA]....
Second, t[his] court gratuitously casts doubt on 'whether necessity can
ever be a defense' to any federal statute that does not explicitly provide for it.
Id. at 499-50l.
105. Id. at 500.
106. Id. at SOL
107. Id. at 500; see also Leah M. Perkins, Supreme Court Upholds Congressional
Classification of Cannabis, 3 No. 13 LAWYERS J. 1 (2001).
108. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 490.
109. Id. at 501. As authority for his statement, Justice Stevens quoted United
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,415(1980):
We therefore hold that, where a criminal defendant is charged with escape and
claims that he is entitled to an instruction on the theory of duress or necessity,
he must proffer evidence of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to cus
tody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.
He then stated, "Our principal difference with the dissent, therefore, is not as to the
existence of such a defense, but as to the importance of surrender as an element of it."
aCBC, 532 U.S. at 501.
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majority's dicta interfered with Prop 215. He stated, regarding the
imposition of federal law contrary to state law, that:
[R]espect for the sovereign states ... imposes a duty on federal
courts to, whenever possible, avoid or minimize conflict between
federal and state law, particularly in situations in which the citi
zens of a State have chosen to "serve as a laboratory" in the trial
of "novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country. "110

Underscoring the limited nature of the holding and his disa
greement with the majority's dicta, Justice Stevens ended his opin
ion with the warning that aeBe should have left two questions
open: "[w]hether it would be an abuse of discretion for the District
Court to refuse to enjoin ... violations" of the CSA by a seriously
ill patient for whom marijuana may be a necessity, and "whether
the District Court may consider the availability of the necessity de
fense for that sort of violator."l11

III.

GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF A NECESSITY DEFENSE

The Supreme Court's holding in aeBe is narrow and limited:
"medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distribut
ing marijuana."112 Beyond this limited holding, the majority as
serted in its dicta that "nothing in our analysis, or the statute,
suggests that a distinction should be drawn between the prohibi
tions on manufacturing and distributing and the other prohibitions
in the Controlled Substances Act. "113 Justice Stevens disagreed
with this broad construction and began the concurring opinion with
a reminder of the "Court's narrow holding" so that it would not "be
lost in its broad dicta. "114
The concurrence disagreed with the majority on three particu
lar points:115 (1) whether, as the majority suggests, the defense of
110. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 502 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting».
111. Id. at 503 .. Justice Stevens indicated that these questions should be decided
when the facts of a future case so warrant, on the authority of cases such as Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
112. DCBC, 532 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 499 n.7. The Court was referring to other CSA prohibitions, one of
which is the use and possession of marijuana. Justice Stevens characterized the major
ity's statement in footnote seven of the majority opinion as "perhaps the most glaring
example of the Court's dicta." Id. at 501 n.2 (referring to the manner in which the
majority's dicta extended beyond the facts and issue of the case).
114. Id. at 499.
115. Id. at 501-03.
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necessity is unavailable not just to manufacturers and distributors,
but also to users and possessors under the CSA; (2) whether the
defense of necessity is, or can be, available as a defense to a federal
statute in instances where the statute does not explicitly or deliber
ately bar it; and (3) whether it would be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to refuse to enjoin certain violations of the CSA, such
as the use and possession of marijuana by a seriously ill patient for
whom the drug may be a necessity.1 16
This Note proposes that a person charged with use or posses
sion of marijuana for medical purposes in violation of the CSA
should be allowed by the courts to use the defense of medical ne
cessity. This claim rests on the analysis of three legal issues ex
amined in this section. The first part of this section examines the
traditional availability of the defense of necessity, specifically,
whether the common law "choice of evils" defense justifies the al
lowance of the necessity defense where physical forces beyond the
defendant's control and lack of legal alternatives to breaking the
law threaten irreparable injury to the defendant. The second part
examines the historical function and scope of the doctrine of judi
cial equitable discretion, specifically, whether it would be an abuse
of equitable discretion for a district court to refuse to enjoin use
and possession of marijuana violations of the CSA, when such use
and possession is related to serious medical need. The third part
examines principles of federalism, as they relate to the duty im
posed upon federal courts to minimize or avoid conflict between
state and federal law, particularly in cases where the citizens of a
state have directly enacted laws that are in conflict with federal law.
Specifically, the third part of the analysis focuses on whether princi
ples of federalism require federal courts to resolve the conflict be
tween the CSA and Prop 215 on the side of Prop 215 because it
represents a situation where the citizens of California have enacted
a law that conflicts with the federal CSA. Additionally, since the
topic of pain relief is inherently tied to the use of marijuana for
medical purposes, the history and scope of the right to pain relief is
discussed generally in each of the Subsections.
A.

The Defense of Necessity
While there seems to be no exact, comprehensive definition of
116.

Id.
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what constitutes a defense of necessity,117 the actual concept has
been "anciently woven into the fabric of our culture."118 History is
filled with situations where the defense has been raised, and a gen
eral understanding of its meaning can be drawn from these con
texts. 119 Some scholars suggest that a defense of necessity
recognizes that one may violate the law to avoid a greater evil. 120
Whatever its origin, the rationale for the necessity defense is
that society is sometimes willing to excuse, or even justify, what
would otherwise be illegal conduct, if done to avoid an even worse
or greater evil.1 21
The pressure of natural physical forces sometimes confronts a
person in an emergency with a choice of two evils: either he may
violate the literal terms of the criminal law and thus produce a
harmful result, or he may comply with those terms and thus pro
duce a greater or equal or lesser amount of harm. For reasons of
social policy, if the harm which will result from compliance with
the law is greater than that which will result from violation of it,
[the defendant] is [by virtue of the defense of necessity] justified
in violating it. 122

While the act of breaking the law itself is voluntary in the sense
that the actor consciously decides to do it, the decision is dictated
by the absence of an acceptable alternative. 123 The act is therefore
excused or justified even though it constitutes otherwise unlawful
conduct.
English and American courts have long recognized the defense
of necessity.1 24 In addition, about half of the states have codified it
into statutes and all of them have historically recognized it as a
common law defense. 125 Similarly, the Model Penal Code ("MPC")
117. See GEORGE E. DIX & MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 718-32 (3d ed.
1987) (discussing necessity, duress, and justification defenses).
118. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in
Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY,
289,291 (1974) (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d
ed.1960».
119. Id. at 291-96; see note 133 infra for a list of such cases.
120. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 441 (2d ed. 1986).
121. Id. at 385.
122. Id.
123. Andrew J. LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 716
n.114 (2000) (citing United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2251 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1976».
124. Arnolds & Garland, supra note 118, at 291-96.
125. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (Michie 1993) (recognizing necessity as
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defines the necessity defense as a choice of evils where: 1) the
threatened injury would be worse than the legal violation, 2) the
law does not provide exceptions or defenses in the particular situa
tion, 3) there is no legislation that specifically forbids the necessity
defense, and 4) the actor has not negligently or recklessly caused
the situation which necessitated the breaking of the law. 126
The Supreme Court in United States v. Bailey 127 stated that the
"defense of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally [encompassed]
the situation where physical forces beyond the actor's control ren
dered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils."128 The Court in Bai
ley also reiterated that "if there was a reasonable, legal alternative
to violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act
and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defense of necessity
would fail."129 With the lack of a federal statute codifying the de
fense of necessity, Bailey remains an important articulation of the
law by the Supreme Court because it established the Court's recog
nition of the availability of the defense of necessity in federal
courtS.130 The defense of necessity has been used in a variety of
situations, such as justifying property damage and trespass or in
other circumstances,131 including cases within a medical context.132

a defense in "choice of evils statute"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(1) (West
1999) (recognizing necessity as a defense in emergency situations to avoid imminent
public or private injury); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 (2001) (recognizing the neces
sity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302 (1999) (recogniz
ing the necessity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.030
(Michie 1999) (recognizing the necessity defense in a "choice of evils statute"); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1997) (recognizing necessity as a defense in emergency
situations to avoid imminent public or private injury).
126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
127. 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
128. [d.
129. Id. (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 379 (1972».
130. Id. at 410-11.
131. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 475
(1994); see also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 comments, at 9-14
(ALI 1985) (discussing typical necessity defense cases); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note
120, at 444 (discussing typical necessity defense applications).
132. See, e.g., State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1979) (defendant suffered
from glaucoma); People v. Bordowitz, 588 N.Y.S.2d 507 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991); State v.
Cole, 874 P.2d 878 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (defendant had history of back pain); State v.
Diana, 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)(defendant suffered from multiple
sclerosis) .
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1.

The Medical Necessity Defense in Marijuana Cases: The
Lesser of Two Evils

The defense of medical necessity is often raised in situations
where the use of drugs to alleviate pain or other effects of terminal
illnesses has resulted in violation of drug laws. l33 While judicial de
cisions indicate mixed results in the acceptance of the medical ne
cessity defense for marijuana use or possession, the basis for the
rationale of the courts that have allowed the use of the defense has
hinged on the core concept of the necessity defense-a choice be
tween conflicting evils. l34 The medical necessity defense should be
available as a relevant excuse or justification for violations of CSA
provisions dealing with use and/or possession of marijuana, on the
ground that medical need renders the violation of the CSA the
lesser of two evils.
Prior to DCBC, the defense of necessity had been raised in
courts throughout the nation by persons claiming a medical need
for the drug. For example, in State v. Hanson,135 the defendant
smoked marijuana to combat the effects of epilepsy medication.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals disallowed the medical necessity
defense because it found that the defense ran counter to the Minne
sota legislature's decision to classify marijuana as a schedule I sub
stance. l36 Similarly, in State v. Tate l37 the defendant smoked
marijuana to provide relief from his quadriplegic condition. l38 The
New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the medical necessity defense
on the ground that the legislature of New Jersey had not given the
133. See, e.g., Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (defendants
had AIDS); Diana, 604 P.2d at 1312.
134. In Randall and Diana, the courts weighed the patient's interests versus the
government's interests before allowing the defense of medical necessity, and in Jenks,
the court allowed the defense of medical necessity after it discussed the medical neces
sity defense elements and the choice of evils concept. See LeVay, supra note 124, at 716
n.114 (citing United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.e. Super. Ct.
1976»; Diana, 604 P.2d at 1315-16; Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 678-79.
135. 468 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
136. Id. at 78-79. See also MINN. STAT. §§ 152.01(7) & 152.02(1) (1990) (attach
ing criminal penalties to the possession, sale, or cultivation of mariJuana).
137. 505 A.2d 941 (N.J. 1986).
138. Quadriplegia is a condition resulting from a spinal chord injury near the
neck, resulting in paralysis of the muscles in the body. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra
note 9, at 82. Sometimes quadriplegia results in spasticity, the involuntary and abnor
mal contraction of muscles. In such cases, marijuana can provide relief. See MARI
JUANA, MEDICINE AND THE LAW: HEARING BEFORE THE U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION 425 (R.e. Randall ed. 1988) (citing and quoting INST. OF MEDICINE,
MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 139 (National Academy Press ed., 1982» [hereinafter
MEDICINE AND THE LAW].
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court discretion to accept the medical necessity defense.13 9
Other courts have allowed the use of the medical necessity de
fense in cases dealing with the medical use of marijuana. 14o In
United States v. Randall ,141 the defendant used marijuana to treat
his glaucoma. 142 The court balanced the defendant's interest in pre
serving his sight against the government's interest in controlling the
drug and concluded that the defendant's interest outweighed the
government's. In arriving at its conclusion, the Randall court ap
plied the reasoning of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma in Stowe v. United States. 143 The
Stowe court had found that the patients' right to medical treatment
outweighed the government's interest in protecting the general
public. Based on this finding, the district court prohibited the FDA
from preventing the patients' use of laetrile to treat their cancer. l44
In State v. Diana,145 the defendant suffered from multiple scle
rosis 146 and claimed that his use of marijuana was supported by
139. See Tate, 505 A.2d at 944-45.
140. See, e.g., People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559 (Cal. 1997); Sowell v. State,
738 So.2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Bachman, 595 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1979);
State v. Hastings, 801 P.2d 563 (Idaho 1990); State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct.
App.1979).
141. LeVay, supra note 124, at 716 n.114 (citing United States v. Randall, 104
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976».
142. The defendant believed that marijuana neutralized the inner-ocular pressure
and decreased the visual distortions caused by glaucoma. Id.; see also GRINSPOON &
BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that glaucoma is the leading cause of blindness in
the U.S. accounting for 10% of the onset of blindness in adults, and afflicting 1.5% of
the population at age 50 and 5% at age 70).
143. Civ. No. 75-0218-B (W.D. Okla. 1975). In Stowe, an unreported civil case,
the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the FDA from preventing their cancer-suffering spouses
from receiving -laetrile, a drug banned by the FDA because it was not proven that it
effectively treated cancer. This reasoning was later applied in Randall. The Randall
court enjoined the FDA because "the patient's right to medical treatment with a sub
stance which had demonstrably favorable effects on their cancers superseded any inter
est of the government in protecting the general public from a drug whose properties
were not conclusively proven." West Virginia v. Donna Jean Poling, No. 26568 (W. Va.
May 10, 2000) (Starcher, J., dissenting), at http://www.state.wv.us/wvscaJdocs/springOO/
26568d.pdf (quoting U.S. v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2253 (D.C. Super.
Ct. 1976». This right to medical treatment was the basis for the court enjoining the
FDA from preventing the plaintiffs from importing laetrile for their own medical use.
See also Keene v. United States, 81 F.R.D. 653 (S.D. w. Va. 1979).
144. Stowe, Civ. No. 75-0128-B.
145. 604 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
146. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 66-68 ("Multiple sclerosis is a dis
order in which patches of myelin (the protective covering of nerve fibers) in the brain
and spinal chord are destroyed and the normal functioning of the nerve fibers them
selves is interrupted."); see also MEDICINE AND THE LAW, supra note 138, at 362 (quot
ing INST. OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND HEALTH 139 (National Academy Press ed.,
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medical research, that he needed marijuana because other drugs
generated unpleasant side effects, and that he unsuccessfully at
tempted to obtain marijuana legally through his doctor. The Wash
ington Court of Appeals held that the medical necessity defense
was justified in certain limited and specific circumstances, such as
those present in that case. 147 The court stated that, in cases where
the medical use of marijuana is in question, "the court must balance
the defendant's interest in preserving his health against the State's
interest in regulating the drug involved. "148
Similarly, in Jenks v. State 149 the defendants used marijuana to
obtain relief from problems derived from AIDS150 and claimed
that, since they could not obtain relief from other alternatives,151
the evil avoided was greater than the evil of violating the law. 152
The court held that the defendants had proved the three elements
necessary for the medical necessity defense: 1) they had not in
tended to contract AIDS; 2) their physicians supported their claim
that no other drug effectively controlled their nausea; and 3) failure
to control the effects of AIDS would put their lives in jeopardy.153
Based on these facts, the court allowed the medical necessity
defense. 154
The bases for the rationale of the courts that have allowed the
use of the defense of necessity in marijuana cases has thus hinged
1982)) (stating that a victim of multiple sclerosis claimed that five minutes after smok
ing marijuana, she stopped vomiting and no longer felt nauseous and that there was a
noticeable reduction in her spasms).
147. Diana, 604 P.2d at 1314-15.
148. Id. at 1317.
149. 582 So. 2d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The defendants, Kenneth and
Barbara Jenks, smoked marijuana to control the nausea caused by some side effects of
AIDS treatment medication. Id. at 677. Kenneth Jenks inherited hemophilia from his
mother and contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion. Kenneth subsequently un
knowingly passed it on to his wife Barbara. Id.
150. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is a deadly disease that
attacks the immune system, making the individual susceptible to opportunistic infec
tions. Many people claim that marijuana helps reduce some negative effects of AIDS
treatment, such as nausea and the inability to keep food down. GRINSPOON &
BAKALAR, supra note 9.
151. Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 679-80. The Jenks' doctor, Dr. Thomas D. Sunnenberg,
testified that "he had been unable to find any effective drug for treating the defendants'
nausea," that the nausea was so debilitating that the defendants could die if it was not
controlled, and that the only drug that controlled their nausea effectively was mari
juana. Id.
152. Id. at 678.
153. Id. at 679-80; see also supra note 151 (discussing the Jenks' doctor's
testimony).
154. Id.
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on the core concept of the necessity defense: the choice between
conflicting "evils."155 On the one hand, there exist the interests of
the government, and on the other, the interests of the medical mari
juana user. These conflicting interests translate into conflicting
evils for both parties: the government's societal interest in prevent
ing drug use represents an "evil" to the patient in medical need of
an illegal drug, whereas an individual's interest in using an illegal
drug for medical reasons represents an "evil" to a government at
tempting to reduce the harmful societal effects of drug use.
The enactment and enforcement of the CSA represents Con
gress' decision to restrict or nullify one individual's medical interest
for the benefit of the greater societal interest. Presumably, Con
gress has made the choice of the greater value, or, conversely, the
choice of the lesser evil. Consequently, an individual must weigh
his or her medical interests against the criminality of his or her ac
tions. Thus, the breaking of the law represents the individual's
choice of engaging in criminality for the benefit of his medical
needs-in this case, the choice of greater value, or lesser evil, to the
individual.
Based on the above reasoning, the medical necessity defense
should be available for violations of CSA provisions dealing with
use or possession of marijuana on the ground that medical need
renders the violation of the CSA the lesser of two evils.
2.

Conflicting Evils: Breaking the Law or Living in Pain

The concept of a choice of evils in the medical marijuana con
text boils down to a choice between 1) breaking the law in the
course of using marijuana and, as a result, relieving pain or remedy
ing some other medical malady or 2) not breaking the law and, as a
result, living with the pain or the medical malady.156
The Supreme Court's articulation in Bailey 157 that the defense
of necessity, or choice of evils, traditionally covered the situation
where physical forces beyond the actor's control rendered illegal
155. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing cases where necessity
defense has been used in medical context).
156. Many of the cited cases illustrate how people use marijuana for a variety of
medical reasons. While this Note focuses on the application of marijuana for pain relief
as a source for its legal reasoning and a basis for its conclusions, it should be noted that
the analysis involved is equally valid for uses of the drug beyond the relief of physical
pain.
157. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
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conduct the lesser of two evils 158 hints at the validity of the medical
defense of necessity in marijuana use cases. Many users claim that
they smoke marijuana to control the pain derived from a variety of
sources, or to avoid starvation resulting from an inability to keep
food down without vomiting, or for other medical reasons,159 all
"beyond the actor's control," which came upon them absent any
fault of their own. On the basis of these physical forces beyond the
actor's control, seriously ill persons should be allowed to use the
defense of necessity in cases dealing with use or possession of mari
juana for medical purposes. 160
In Bailey, the Supreme Court reiterated that if there were rea
sonable, legal alternatives to violating the law, "a chance both to
refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened
harm," the defense of necessity would fail.1 61 Users of medical ma
rijuana are typically faced with a bleak choice between the refusal
to commit the criminal act of smoking marijuana, and consequent
harm to themselves, or the avoidance of the harm by voluntarily
committing the criminal act. 162 In some cases, courts have found
that the possibility of rescheduling marijuana outside of schedule II
(thUS allowing for its legal medical prescription) represents an ad
ministrative alternative and, therefore, the Bailey standard of ex
hausting all available potential remedies is not met. 163 Other courts
158. Id. at 410.
159. See Marcia 1iersky, Comment, Medical Marijuana: Putting the Power Where
it Belongs, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 547, 552-63 (1999). In the twentieth century, physicians
have found marijuana to be an effective treatment for a range of ailments, including:
nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy; weight loss associated with AIDS;
glaucoma; epilepsy; muscle spasms and chronic pain in cases of multiple sclerosis;
quadriplegia and other spastic disorders; migraines; severe pruritus; and depression and
other mood disorders. Id. at 552-63; see also GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at
163-75 (stating that physicians have found marijuana useful in treating asthma, insom
nia, dystonia, scleroderma, Crohn's Disease, and diabetic gastroparesis).
160. See e.g., Jenks, 582 So. 2d at 679-80; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN § 5-2-604
(Michie 1993) (recognizing the necessity defense in "choice of evil" statute); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702(1) (West 1990) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463
(1995) (same); HAW. REv. STAT. § 703-320 (1993) (same).
161. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMI.
NAL LAW § 28, at 379 (1972)).
162. For example, a person who smokes marijuana to ameliorate her pain can
either voluntarily choose not to break the law by ceasing to smoke marijuana or can
voluntarily choose to break the law by continuing to smoke marijuana. In the former
instance, if she cannot find an alternative method of pain control, she will adhere to the
law but live in uncontrollable pain. Alternatively, in the latter instance, she will be in
conscious violation of the law, but she will live without the pain.
163. LeVay, supra note 124, at 728 n.208 (citing Order, United States v. Smith,
No. S-97-558 GEB (E.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that since the defendant had not pursued
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have recognized the logistical impracticality and unrealistic time re
quirements of such an alternative and have, on that basis, con
cluded that rescheduling does not represent a reasonable
alternative. 164 The defense of medical necessity should therefore be
available in circumstances where the user lacks a reasonable alter
native in his or her treatment of the effects of the medical malady.
Under United States v. Bailey, the opportunity to avoid the
threatened harm renders the necessity defense inapplicable. 165 For
seriously ill individuals using marijuana to combat pain or other
maladies, the lack of legal alternatives represents an absence of
choice or power to avoid the threatened harm. This lack of power
to avoid personal injury forms a basis for the allowance of the ne
cessity defense in cases of use or possession of marijuana for medi
cal purposes.
Furthermore, viewed in the textual context of the MPC, a
choice between evils, or, stated another way, the defense of neces
sity, is valid where the threatened injury is worse than the legal vio
lation and where the law does not otherwise explicitly bar it. 166 For
a medical marijuana user, the potential for his or her living in con
tinuous pain, or with some other bodily impairment that may be
remedied by the use of marijuana,167 represents a significant
"threatened injury." Where the legislature has not clearly man
dated otherwise and no other legal alternative exists, the choice of
evils doctrine should apply favorably to a defendant charged with a
violation of the CSA because of marijuana use for medical pur
poses, since the threatened injury to the individual of not using the
drug is greater to that individual than the violation of the law.

the option of rescheduling marijuana, he had "bypassed the available administrative
procedures established by Congress to effect a change in how marijuana is classified
under federal law"».
164. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (doubting whether a rescheduling petition is a reasonable alternative for all
seriously ill patients whose physicians recommended marijuana for therapeutic
purposes).
165. Bailey, 44 U.S. at 410.
166. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985) (defining the necessity defense as a
choice of evils where 1) the threatened injury would be worse than the legal violation,
2) the law does not provide exceptions or defenses in the particular situation, 3) there is
no legislation that specifically forbids the necessity defense, and 4) the actor has not
negligently or recklessly caused the predicament which necessitated the breaking of the
law).
167. See supra notes 156 & 159 and accompanying text.

2003]MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE 173

B.

The Purpose of Equity: Irreparable Injury and Inadequacy of
Legal Remedies 168

The formulation of an exception to the strictness of the law
became necessary long ago, as evidenced by the equitable remedies
doctrine that has existed since the beginning of our system of juris
prudence.1 69 The Supreme Court has held that parties seeking in
junctive relief in the federal courts must always show "irreparable
injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies."17o Equitable jurisdic
tion has traditionally functioned to establish a judicial framework
through which parties in dispute may arrive at a "nice adjustment
and reconciliation."l71
1.

Exercising Equitable Discretion

Equity in American jurisprudence has been characterized by a
special type of flexible judicial power: the power to examine cases
individually and to provide remedies appropriate to the specific cir
cumstances. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power
of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has
distinguished it."l72 When considering the appropriate remedy, a
court of equity should consider the circumstances; specifically, the
benefits and injuries to each party resulting from the equitable judi
cial remedyP3 Moreover, courts of equity, in exercising their dis
cretion and employing the remedy of an injunction, must consider
the consequences not just to the parties in dispute, but also to the
public at largeP4 Consequently, where a court's injunction to the
violation of a law "will adversely affect a public interest," the court
has the discretionary power to withhold enforcement of that law,
168. Although equitable jurisdiction can form part of an argument in support of a
medical necessity defense, in this Note the two issues are treated separately in Parts
III.A and III.B.
169. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that the practice
of equitable jurisdiction has a history of several hundred years).
170. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citing Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975».
171. Id. (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at ~29).
172. Id.
173. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (stating that in equitable
jurisdiction, "the court balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them according [to how] they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the
injunction ").
174. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312 (stating that courts of equity should pay
particular attention to the public consequences of their use of injunctions when exercis
ing their discretion) (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941».
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even where "the postponement of enforcement may be burden
some to the plaintiff."175 This practice of considering all the cir
cumstances of a case, as well as the consequences of any decision
upon the parties, prior to the determination of a remedy in a court
of equitable jurisdiction is an integral part of the American system
of jurisprudence. 176
The prominent flexibility of equitable jurisdiction is equally ap
plicable when a statute is at issuey7 "A grant of jurisdiction to is
sue compliance orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so
under any and all circumstances ... and a federal judge sitting as a
chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for
every violation of the law."178

a.

Bodily Integrity

The issue of the medical use of marijuana should be viewed
through the judicial lens of equity. Courts of equity, when consid
ering appropriate remedies, have traditionally considered the bene
fits and injuries to each party and to society as a whole and have
been flexible with their judicial power, examining cases individually
to provide remedies that are appropriate to the circumstances. 179
In the case of a person using marijuana to alleviate pain or other
maladies, such use relates to the most basic decisions about bodily
integrity. Such a decision involves vital implications for the individ
ual, as well as for society at large. 180
In 1914, then-judge Cardozo underscored the importance of
control over one's body when he stated, "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body ...."181 The use of marijuana by adults to
combat illness or its symptoms, particularly when alternatives are
unavailable, lies at the heart of control of one's body. For that rea
son, the use of marijuana for medical purposes should be examined,
with particular emphasis, in the light of the mercy and fairness
175. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
176. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313 (stating that "[t]hese commonplace consider
ations applicable to cases in which injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect a
'practice with a background of several hundred years of history'" (quoting Hecht, 321
U.S. at 329».
177. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also Hecht, 321 U.S. 321.
178. TVA, 437 U.S. at 193; Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concur
ring) (stating that the Constitution limits states' interference with such decisions).
181. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914».
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driven doctrine of judicial equity.1 82 The Supreme Court clarified
that the Constitution extends protection to the right of control over
one's body, when it stated that "[i]t is settled now ... that the Con
stitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's
most basic decisions about . . . bodily integrity."183 On these
grounds, the medical use of marijuana should fall within the scope
of equitable jurisdiction because disputes involving seriously ill in
dividuals who use marijuana can lead to continued suffering, to ag
gravation of serious medical conditions, and even to death. Such
detrimental outcomes for these medical marijuana users directly af
fect bodily integrity and typically result from adverse court rulings
that deprive medical marijuana users of their only method of pain
control or other adverse symptom control. Equitable discretion,
thus, offers the possibility to arrive at a "nice adjustment" while
avoiding irreparable harm to an individual.
b.

Equitable Prevention of Unnecessary Pain

Courts of equity should have an inherent role in preventing
irreparable harm to ordinary people who use marijuana for the re
lief of their pain or discomfort when nothing else provides such re
lief. Sometimes, persons suffering from a serious illness can resort
only to marijuana for effective treatment because other alterna
tives, legal or otherwise, are ineffective in the treatment of their
maladies or symptoms. 184 Furthermore, such seriously ill individu
als often lack the benefit of remedies that are both legal and effec
tive, resulting in a real threat not only to their well-being but to
their lives as well.1 85 When these individuals' quality of life be
comes almost unbearable, anything that improves their quality of
life has a constitutional dimension. 186 In such circumstances, a
common understanding of "liberty" should encompass the right to
182. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329 ("The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public
interest and private needs ....").
183. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992);
see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing a
liberty interest in refusing medical treatment).
184. See e.g., GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 9, at 28-33 (stating that the
patient's doctor had been unable to find any effective drug for treating the patient's
nausea, that the nausea was so debilitating that the patient was incapacitated, and that
the only drug that controlled his nausea effectively was marijuana).
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of effective
drugs to treat some patients).
186. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concur
ring); see also id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
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mitigate, where feasible, the suffering underlying such an unbear
able existence. "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State. "187 In fact, "defin[ing] one's own concept of exis
tence" is the essence of the natural law expressed in the Declara
tion of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness."188 Accordingly, in Board of Regents
v. Roth,189 the Court stated that it had not attempted to define the
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution with precision because "[i]n
a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed."190
It is a basic notion in a civilized society, and even more so in a
free and democratic one, that individuals who are suffering, vulner
able, or in need are to be afforded care, assistance, and understand
ing beyond that normally afforded to others not in their
predicament.191 In accordance with these beliefs, some members of
the Supreme Court have articulated that the treatment of intolera
ble pain is something to which all human beings are entitled. 192
"Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's final
days incapacitated and in agony is certainly '[a]t the heart of [the]
liberty ... to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life."'193
So strong is our society's belief that people are entitled to com
bat their pain that many states have enacted laws categorically au
thorizing pain treatment even where it hastens death,194 despite the
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)) (highlighting the Supreme Court's stance that all human be
ings are entitled to the treatment of intolerable pain).
187. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850-51.
188. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
189. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
190. /d. at 572.
191. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731 ("[T]he state has an interest in protecting
vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons- from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes.").
192. See id. at 777 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 745 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
193. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of South
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
194. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the state of
Washington "generally permits physicians to administer medication to patients in termi
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long and steady historical opposition to euthanasia. Not only is the
average person entitled to exist without pain (to the extent that it is
medically and practically feasible) but, so fundamental are Ameri
can societal notions in this area, that they lead one to conclude, as
did our founding fathers, that even the most horrible criminals are
entitled to safeguards against cruel and unusual punishment. 195
It seems, therefore, that even the most vicious criminals have
the right to be punished and to live, or even die, without pain. Few
would argue that consciously and purposefully subjecting a con
victed criminal to pain is acceptable in our society today. Yet many
argue that, in certain circumstances, allowing ordinary people who
are not convicted criminals to suffer is acceptable. 196 To avoid this
scenario, courts of equity should have an inherent role in prevent
ing unnecessary pain to ordinary people who use marijuana for the
relief of their pain or discomfort when nothing else provides such
relief. To do so, courts of equity should be able to exercise their
discretion in a manner that allows individuals who meet certain cri
teria to medicate themselves with whatever relieves their pain, or to
make use of the defense of necessity in furtherance of such action,
notwithstanding the criminalization of the medication or the strict
letter of the law. This flexibility has characterized courts of equity
for hundreds of years.1 97 Additionally, this type of molding of the
remedy to each particular case has defined the rationale for such
nal conditions when the primary intent is to alleviate pain, even when the medication is
so powerful as to hasten death and the patient chooses to receive it with that under
standing"). A number of other states do the same. See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1
2.5(a)(1) (West 1998) (exempting from assisted suicide ban licensed health care provid
ers who administer or dispense medications or procedures to relieve pain or discomfort,
even if such medications or procedures hasten death, unless provider intends to cause
death); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.3.1 (West Supp. 2002) (same); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 216.304 (Michie 1998) (same); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 752.1027(3) (West Supp.
2002) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215(3)(a) (West Supp. 2002) (same); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2133.11(A)(6), 2133.12(E)(1) (West Supp. 2002) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-60-4(a) (2000) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-37.1 (Michie 1998) (same);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(b)(2) (1997). Other states permit patients to sign in
structions or waivers authorizing pain treatment even where it may hasten death. See,
e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-804,5-809 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7A-4, 24-7A-9 (Michie 2000); S.c. CODE ANN. § 62-5-504 (Law. Co
op. Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2984, 54.1-2988 (Michie 2002).
195. See U.S. CaNsT. amend. VIII.
196. See State v. Hanson, 468 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (preventing
the defendant from using marijuana to obtain relief from his epilepsy seizures because
in the opinion of the court the medical necessity defense ran counter to legislative in
tent); see also State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941, 946-47 (N.J. 1986) (preventing the defen
dant's use of marijuana to ease severe spasms associated with quadriplegia).
197. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
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courts since the beginning of our system of jurisprudence.198
In some instances, equity demands that a human being who is
suffering, vulnerable,or in need be allowed to use marijuana to re
lieve his or her pain or discomfort, if such an allowance is the only
legal remedy and thus the only way to prevent both the "inade
quacy of legal remedies" and "irreparable injury."199 This assertion
rests on the very purpose of the doctrine of equitable jurisdiction
to alleviate the inadequacy of existing legal remedies 2oo-and that
courts of equity exercise their discretion on the basis of the facts of
each case.201 A society that calls for the existence of courts of eq
uity can hardly refuse equity's application in instances where peo
ple are in pain. It is difficult to envision circumstances more
demanding of, or appropriate for, an equitable remedy than the al
lowance of pain control where, absent such allowance, the applica
tion of the strict letter of the law results in preventable human
suffering.
Allowance of the medical necessity defense in cases where the
medical use of marijuana results in violation of the CSA thus pre
vents, in certain instances, the irreparable harm and suffering that
results from the application of the strict letter of the CSA. Moreo
ver, it does so without the judicial need to overrule the CSA in its
entirety. Furthermore, a court sitting in equity is best suited to
weigh and balance the factors it deems proper in its consideration
of an equitable remedy.202 The court should consider the benefits
and detriments to the individual of marijuana use by a seriously ill
person as well as the benefits and detriments to the public at large
of that person's use.2° 3 Whether or not the court should exercise its
198. Id.
199. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
200. Id. (quoting Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329).
201. See Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329.
202. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
203. Id. New figures released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2001 show an
on-going rate of growth for state and federal prisoners. However, in contrast to the
relatively stable growth of state prison populations of 0.3%, the federal prison count is
rising at an alarming rate of 8%. This primarily reflects the continuing general impact
of federal drug policies, and marijuana policies in particular, reflected in the fact that
drug offenders constitute 57% of federal prisoners. As a specific illustration of the
impact of marijuana users upon the total incarceration count, in the year 2000, of the
1,579,566 total drug-related arrests, 46.5%, or 734,497, were for marijuana violations
alone. Of these, 646,042, or 88%, were for simple possession, the category including
medical marijuana users. THE SENTENCING PROJECf, NEW PRISON POPULATION
FIGURES: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY (2002), available at www.sentencingproject.org!
newslbjsreport-july2002.pdf.
To contrast the societal effects of these numbers with other western or populous
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equitable discretion and allow the individual to use marijuana, even
in violation of the law, should then be decided on the basis of the
weight of the interests .of the seriously ill person versus those of
society in general, as equitably balanced by the court. 204 In such
instances, courts of equity would consider this analysis on a case-by
case basis.205 Whether the court finds that an equitable exception
to the violation of drug laws in such cases is warranted, judicial tra
dition supports the application of equitable remedies when the po
tential exists for irreparable harm to an individual or adverse
consequences to the public.
2.

Equitable Discretion and CSA Language: Imputed
Knowledge and Statutory Ambiguity

Given the American legal system's long tradition of equitable
discretion, when Congress enacts laws, it presumably does so with
an understanding of the principles of equitable jurisdiction, "a prac
tice of which Congress is assuredly well aware."206 Therefore, Con
gress must be imputed with the knowledge that, absent clear
language to the contrary, equitable principles should, and will, ap
ply to the interpretation of a statute such as the CSA. Accordingly,
given the absence in the CSA of clear language to the contrary,
Congress cannot be said to have intended to bar the use of the nied
ical necessity defense in a case where the defendant is a seriously ill
person charged with marijuana use or possession in violation of the
CSA.
Furthermore, the ambiguous statutory language of the CSA,
nations, a 1999 Justice Policy Institute study found that in the United States, 52.7% of
state prison inmates, 73.7% of jail inmates, and 87.6% of federal inmates were jailed for
non-violent offenses (including drug-related offenses). John Irwin, Ph.D., Vincent
Shiraldi & Jason Ziedenberg, America's One Million Nonviolent Prisoners (Just. Pol'y
Inst., D.C.) Mar. 1999, available at http://www.cjcj.orgipubs!one_millionlonemiliion.
html. The non-violent prisoner population of the United States is three times the com
bined violent and non-violent prisoner population of the entire European Union (pos
sessing a combined general population of 370 million, compared to the U.S. population
of 274 million). Id. The study also found that the number of non-violent prisoners in
the U.S. is five times the number of people held in India's entire prison system, even
though India has a population four times that of the U.S. Id.
As a further illustration of the negative effects upon the public at large, the report
found that the costs involved with the incarceration of non-violent offenders in 1998
($24 billion) exceeded the entire federal welfare budget ($16.6 billion), which provides
support for some 8.5 million Americans, and that the U.S. spends more in building
prisons ($2.6 billion) than universities ($2.5 billion). Id.
204. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440.
205. /d.
206. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313.
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made apparent in OCBC through the obvious interpretive disagree
ment among the Justices,207 should be sufficient to invoke the full
effect of the Court's equitable discretion in the determination of a
remedy that avoids irreparable harm to the defendant. The Su
preme Court has held that "the comprehensiveness of this equitable
jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear
and valid legislative command. "208 The Court, in Weinberger v. Ro
mero-Barcelo, emphasized this point when it stated:
Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and ines
capable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.
'The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should
not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'209

In OCBC, the disagreement among the Justices regarding
whether the CSA allows the common law defense of necessity illus
trates the inherent ambiguity and doubtful construction of the CSA
and its lack of clear language. While four Justices construed CSA
language to bar the use of the necessity defense, three others inter
preted the CSA text to potentially allow for it. This statutory ambi
guity demonstrates an absence of "clear and valid legislative
command" and should provide sufficient grounds for the judicial
exercise of equitable discretion in order for courts to allow the de
fense of medical necessity in cases where a user of medical mari
juana violates the CSA.
C.

One of the Happy Incidents of the Federal System: Why Use
and Possession Should Be Distinguished from
Distribution and Manufacture of Medical Marijuana

The essence of the doctrine of federalism is embodied in the
popular modern movement in the United States toward the legali
zation of marijuana as a medicine. 210 Nine states, with more than

207. See supra Part II.B.; United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532
U.S. 483, 496 (2001).
208. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946».
209. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836».
210. See Harry N. Scheiber, Foreword: The Direct Ballot and State Constitutional
ism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 801-807 (1997) (stating that the ballot initiative (1) serves to
keep government closer to the people it is meant to serve; (2) allows for diversity and
experimentation among the states, in accordance with Justice Brandeis' vision of labo
ratories of experimentation; and (3) keep government more competent and effective by
allowing the states to govern the daily lives of its citizens).
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20% of the nation's population, have passed ballot initiatives which
legalize the medical use of marijuana and are, as a result, in conflict
with federal law prohibiting the use or possession of marijuana for
any purpose. 211 "Between 1978 and 1996, legislatures in 34 states
and the District of Columbia passed laws recognizing marijuana's
therapeutic value. 212 Twenty-three of these laws remain in effect
today."213 If the courts do not distinguish the use and possession
from the manufacture and distribution of medical marijuana under
the CSA, these states will face the same obstacles as California
faced when it implemented Prop 215.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Lopez 214
and United States v. Morrison,215 illustrate the Court's continued
commitment to the principles embodied in the doctrine of federal
ism. 216 In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority opin
211. Arizona and California voters approved medical marijuana laws in 1996. See
NORML, MEDICAL USE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at httpllwww.norml.orglin
dex.cfm?Group_ID=3387 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002). Voters in Alaska, Oregon, and
Washington approved similar laws in 1998. Id. District of Columbia voters approved a
similar initiative in 1998 by a 69% margin, but Congress invalidated the law. Id. Voters
in Maine approved a medical marijuana law in 1999. Id. In Hawaii, the Senate ap
proved a bill that protects seriously ill patients who use marijuana medically from local
and state prosecution. It was signed into law on June 14, 2000, by Governor Cayetano.
Id. In 2000, Nevada and Colorado citizens passed similar medical marijuana initiatives.
See NORML, MEDICAL MARIJUANA INITIATIVES PASS IN COLORADO AND NEVADA;
CALIFORNIANS PASS INITIATIVE To KEEP NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS OUT OF
JAIL, at httpllwww.norml.orglnews/archives/00-ll-09.sctml. Also worthy of note is the
fact that no state has rejected an initiative that solely addressed medical marijuana.
212. See NORML, STATEMENT ON THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA: SCIENCE
SUPPORTS AMENDING FEDERAL LAW, at httpllwww.norml.orglmedical/index.html.
These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecti
cut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachu
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten
nessee, Texas, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. Id.
213. Id. These states are Alabama, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Iowa, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Ver
mont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
214. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
215. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
216. In both cases, the Supreme Court refused to accept, as a basis for the exer
cise of commerce powers, the effects upon the national economy of either gun posses
sion near schools or violence against women. In Lopez, a federal grand jury indicted
Alfonso Lopez, a twelfth-grade student who brought a gun to school, under the Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"), Pub. L No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codi
fied as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 921,922,924). The GFSZA made it a federal crime for
"any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows ...
is a school zone." 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held that the GFSZA was unconstitutional because it "neither regulates a com
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ion with a foreword on federalism principles. He stated that "[w]e
start with first principles," and quoting James Madison, reminded
us that "[t]he powers delegated ... to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State govern
ments are numerous and indefinite."217 Justice Rehnquist also
stressed that "a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front."218 In the same spirit, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor emphasized in their concurrence that "[w]ere the Fed
eral Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of
traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regu
lation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres
of federal and state authority would blur and ·political responsibility
would become illusory."219 Similarly, in Morrison, the Court re
jected the "argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, vi
olent criminal conduct solely based on that conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce."220 The majority emphasized that
"[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly na
tional and what is truly local."221
CSA prohibitions that interfere with California's medical mari
juana laws should be viewed as being inconsistent with fundamental
principles of federalism. 222 First, the CSAregulates in traditional
mercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way
to interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The Court stated that, were it to
accept the government's argument and aggregate non-economic conduct to arrive at
interstate commercial activity, it would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an
individual that Congress is without power to regulate." Id. at 564.
In Morrison, a female student brought suit under § 13981 of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.c. §§ 13981-14040 (1996), against two male students. The
Supreme Court invalidated § 13981, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, enacted to compensate
for the inadequacy of state court remedies afforded to victims of gender motivated vio
lence, id. at 620. The Court applied the reasoning in Lopez, stating that federalism
principles underlined the Lopez majority's analysis and that to allow the expansion of
congressional reach would "completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction be
tween national and local authority." Id. at 615.
217. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961».
218. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991».
219. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577.
220. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
221. Id.
222. See Conant v. Walters, 2002 WL 31415494, at *8 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002)
("Our decision is consistent with principles of federalism that have left the states as the
primary regulators of professional conduct.") While Conant was decided primarily on
First Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit also relied on the limiting principles of
federalism doctrine, and cited Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) ("recogniz
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areas of state concern. Second, its prohibitions undermine one of
the essential advantages of the federalist structure of the U.S. gov
ernment-that individual states act as laboratories of social experi
mentation where they can legislate in the manner that best suits
their citizens and their circumstances. Thus, courts should allow the
defense of necessity in cases that involve the use or possession of
medical marijuana because such allowance permits the enforcement
of the CSA in a manner consistent with these principles of
federalism.

1.

Interference with Powers Reserved to the States

While federalism principles have played a major role in Ameri
can government for over two centuries, serving to limit the incur
sion by the federal government upon state affairs, critics assert that
these limitations have grown weaker over the years and the incur
sions have increased dangerously.223 As a consequence of this con
tinuing federal intrusion, some areas of traditional state control
have become subject to federal control. The CSA is just one exam
ple. Whereas states have traditionally had, under their general po
lice powers, the right to regulate and control public health, safety,
welfare, and morals,224 the CSA intrudes upon the states' control of
these areas. 225 The use of marijuana generally implicates all four
police powers since the consequences or implications of marijuana
use affect health, safety, crime, and morals. More. particularly,
however, the use of marijuana for medical purposes conspicuously
implicates public health and welfare directly,226 and the drug's
criminalization strongly implicates crime control, also a tradition
ing states broad police powers to regulate the administration of drugs by health profes
sionals"), and Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5,18 (1925) (holding that "direct control
of medical practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government"), as
additional support for its holding that California doctors are allowed to recommend
medical marijuana under the authority of Prop 215.
223. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]II that stands between the remaining essentials of state
sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.").
224. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
225. See U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 532 U.S. 483, 487 (2001) (stat
ing that the federal government was seeking to "enjoin the Cooperative from distribut
ing and manufacturing marijuana ... wheti).er or not the Cooperative's activities are
legal under California law, they violate federal law ... specifically ... the [CSA]").
226. California's Proposition 215, the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, is codified
in CAL. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (West 1996) (emphasis added to the title of the
code).
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ally recognized function of the states under their police powers. 227
Moreover, whereas in Lopez and Morrison Congress at
tempted to enact, and the federal government to enforce, a federal
law that was intended to exist alongside state law,228 the issue of the
co-existence of federal and state laws is significantly different when
it comes to medical marijuana. Through its enforcement of the
CSA, the federal government intends to preclude the states from
exercising their will altogether where there is a clash between state
laws which authorize the medical use of marijuana and the CSA
which prohibits such use. 229 Federalism principles demand that
powers not conferred on the federal government belong to the
states. 230
On the basis of this allocation of powers, CSA provisions that
interfere with California's medical marijuana laws should be consid
ered inconsistent with federalism principles because California is
exercising its police powers in an area traditionally of state con
cern. 231 The conflict with federalism principles is illustrated by the
fact that, although California has expressly authorized the use of
medical marijuana in certain circumstances, the implementation of
such laws is barred under the CSA. Therefore, the CSA's interfer
ence with California law is at odds with the Supreme Court's long
established recognition that states retain their police powers as part
of the division of powers which form part of the federalism
doctrine. 232
227. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (describing the constitu
tional framework of our government divided among the national government and the
states).
228. In Morrison, the provision of a federal civil remedy for victims of gender
motivated violence did not interfere with similar state provisions, providing additional
protection beyond that provided by state statutes. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 601-02 (2000).
229. c.t Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
230. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8 (specifying the powers of the federal government); see
also U.S. CaNST. amend. X (reserving for the states those powers not delegated by the
Constitution to the federal government).
231. Judge Alex Kozinski of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, one of three judges
assigned to rule on the government's appeal to crack down on doctors who recommend
marijuana for medical use, stated, "Why in this world does an administration that's
committed to federalism want to go to this length to put doctors in jail for doing things
that are perfectly legal under state law?" Claire Cooper, Effort to Muzzle Pro-pot Doc
tors Argued in Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 9, 2002, available at www.freedomto
exhale.com/sab.htm.
232. See Anna Johnson Cramer, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: A
Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REv. 271, 288
(2000). According to the Executive Director of NORML, Keith Stroup, the problem
atic nature of this interference, and Congress' manifested concern in that regard, is well
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The Supreme Court unanimously held in OeBe that the fed
eral government has the power to regulate the distribution and
manufacture of marijuana and that the medical necessity defense is
not available because Congress had not authorized it in the CSA.233
However, the Court has strong legal grounds on which to distin
guish OeBe from a case involving charges of use or possession of
marijuana brought against a seriously ill individual using the drug
for medical purposes. In contrast to the manufacture and distribu
tion of the drug, control over the use or possession of marijuana for
medical purposes is tied to governmental functions-the regulation
of health and safety-that the Court has traditionally recognized as
within the purview of states' police powers.234
Moreover, the Court should distinguish distribution and manu
facture from use and possession of medical marijuana in cases re
lated to CSA prohibitions against the use of marijuana and, more
specifically, the defense of medical necessity in such cases, on the
basis of a principle articulated by Justice Brandeis in 1932: the im
portant role of laboratories for novel social experiments in the fur
therance of our democracy.235
2.

Laboratories of Social Experimentation

In creating a form of government in which the powers of the
federal government were limited and non-enumerated powers were
reserved to the states, the founding fathers recognized that all fifty
illustrated by the fact that on July 23, 2001, a mere two months after the Supreme Court
ruling in DCBC, the States' Rights to Medical Marijuana Act was introduced into the
United States Congress "to amend federal law so that states that wish to permit the
legal use of marijuana as a medicine for seriously ill patients may do so, without inter
ference from the federal government." Press Release, NORML, Congressional Alert
on Medial Marijuana, at www.norml.orglindex.cfm?Group_ID=5347 (last updated Dec.
9, 2002). The Act, originally introduced in July 2001, was referred to the Health Sub
committee of the Energy and Commerce Committee. H.R. 2592, 107th Congo (1st Sess.
2001). However, "[d]espite bipartisan co-sponsorship from 36 members of Congress,
the committee failed to schedule a hearing or vote on H.R. 2592, effectively cutting off
all Congressional debate on the proposal." Id. On July 24, 2002, Representatives Bar
ney Frank (D-Ma.), Ron Paul (R-Tex.), Dana Rohrabacher (R-Cal.), and Janice
Schakowsky (D-Ill.) joined former Ronald Reagan presidential aide Lyn Nofziger and
seriously ill patients in a Capitol Hill press conference calling on Congress to act on the
Bill. Id.
233. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 493-94
(2001).
234. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 224-27 (discussing the line be
tween state sovereignty and Congress).
235. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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states need not enact the same laws, but that each could develop its
own laws consistent with its particular circumstances. 236 The issue
of the use of marijuana for medical purposes affects different states
in different ways and to different extents. For example, whereas in
California about fourteen persons per 100,000 suffer from AIDS, in
Wyoming, only two person per 100,000 does. 237 Given these differ
ences, it makes sense that the approach taken to combat the disease
collectively, as well as to combat the symptoms individually, might
be different in the two states.
Justice Brandeis identified the existence of differences among
states and their populations, and found a well-suited, built-in mech
anism in the American form of government to address this diver
sity.238 He stated, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi
ments without risk to the rest of the country."239
The notion of the states as "laboratories" has at least two as
pects. 240 First, after thorough testing in a variety of contexts, a na
tional solution will emerge that is suitable for implementation in
every state. 241 Second, based on American notions of pluralism242
and re1ativism,243 and given the wide variations in conditions and
preferences in a country as diverse as ours, different solutions may
be best for different states. 244

236. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 3 (1987) (defin
ing federalism as a division of power between the federal government and state govern
ments). See also infra notes 238-39; New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 280-311 (Brandeis, 1.,
dissenting).
237. Centers for Disease Control, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, SURVEY
REPORT VOL. 13, No.2 table 2, available at http://www.cdc.govlhiv/stats/hasr1302/ta
ble2.htm.
238. See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 310-11.
239. Id. at 311.
240. See DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85 (1995).
241. Id.
242. Pluralism is defined as "a view that theories of what is right and good are
relative in that ethical truths depend upon the individuals and groups holding them.
. . ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1916 (3d ed. 1976).
243. Relativism is defined as "a metaphysical theory that there are more than
one... kind[ 1of ultimate reality" or "a state or condition of society in which members
of diverse ethnic, racial, religious or social groups maintain an autonomous participa
tion in ... their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a common
civilization." Id. at 1745.
244. SHAPIRO, supra note 240.

2003]MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE MEDICAL NECESSITY DEFENSE 187

a.

Adherence to the Laboratories Design

When Congress exerts its power over the states and deliber
ately overturns the will of a state or its people, it should only do so
in a manner acceptable in the light of our "laboratories" design.
The legalization of marijuana for medical purposes in the United
States is becoming an increasingly popular idea, and greater num
bers of people support the concept every day.245 As Justice Stevens
reminded the majority in GCBC, "[R]espect [for the sovereign
states] imposes a duty on federal courts, whenever possible, to
avoid or minimize conflict between federal and state law ...."246
When the federal government refuses to acknowledge actions
of the people in a state and of a state itself, fundamental concepts of
federalism are undermined. 247 Federalism principles require the di
vision of government powers through their apportionment between
the federal and state governments. 248 The very purpose of our dual
system of government is to restrain either government from intrud
ing upon the protected freedoms of the people. 249 One of the goals
of federalism is to accomplish this task through the particular allo
cation of responsibilities and powers to the state governments and,
separately, to the federal government. 250 When one government
pushes out beyond its prescribed boundaries, it invades the allotted
territory of the other and, by so doing, erodes the barriers to abu
245. NORML, FAVORABLE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLLS 1995-2000, at http://
www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4457 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002). Gallop Poll,
March 1999 (73% of respondents support "making marijuana legally available to doc
tors to prescribe"); CNN Interactive Poll, April 1999 (96% of respondents said they
"support the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes"); Journal of American Medicine
Association Poll, conducted by Harvard School of Public Health, March 1998 (60% of
respondents "supported allowing physicians to prescribe medical marijuana"); ABC
NewslDiscovery News Poll, May 1997 (69% of respondents favored "legalizing [the]
medical use of marijuana"). Id.
246. aCBC, 532 U.S. at 502.
247. See New State lee, 285 U.S. at 311 ("To stay experimentation in things social
and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.")
248. United States v. Lopez, 519 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
249. See generally BERGER, supra note 236, at 131; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It
was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.") (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
250. See aCBC, 532 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J., concurring); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 532;
see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,615,617 (2000) (articulating that Con
gress must exercise its power so as to preserve the distinction between national and
local authority, a distinction that was designed "so that the people's rights would be
secured by the division of power").
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sive government-precisely the consequence that the founders of
our nation intended to avoid, or at least minimize. 251
To the extent that the people of the individual states are mak
ing their wishes known through their actions at the ballot box, the
federal government has a responsibility to comply with those wishes
or, at the very least, minimize the potential conflict between the
wishes of the people and its own actions. 252 "The Framers recog
nized that the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of
government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for
dealing with them. This is as true today as it was when the Consti
tution was adopted."253
As democratic as local representative governments are, as
compared to federal government, referendums and initiatives are
even more democratic. Such popular ballot measures allow citizens
to raise and vote on issues important to them that, in many in
stances, lack sufficient political support, or are too controversial, to
be addressed by 1egislatures.254 Prop 215 and the many other initia
tives and referendums dealing with medical marijuana 255 represent
this type of lawmaking. These medical marijuana initiatives would
not have been enacted absent the direct promotion and participa
tion by the populace.
In some instances, the voice of the people has directly contra
dicted the voice of the legislature. For example, in 1996, the citi
zens of Arizona passed Proposition 200256 only to have the Arizona
251. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
252. See OCBC, 532 U.S. at 500-02 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
254. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects
of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 149, 168 (1996) ("[Tlhe
initiative system allows issues to be considered by the populace and not by elected
officials with their own, particular self-interests .... [Ilnitiative lawmaking empowers a
type of constituency that is represented very differently in a more republican form of
government. ").
255. Since 1996, initiatives allowing for the medical use of marijuana have been
placed on ballots in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, Washing
ton, and the District of Columbia. See Election '98: The Vote For Medical Marijuana
And Drug Policy Reform (Drug Pol'y Found., D.C. 1998), at 5, available at http://www.
drcnet.org/election98/elections98.html (offering an in-depth description of 1998 ballot
initiatives).
256. Proposition 200, Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3412.01 (2001) was approved by Arizona voters on November 5,
1996. Proposition 200 amended title 13, chapter 9 of the Arizona Revised Statutes by
adding § 13-901.01, which allows "any person who is convicted of the personal posses
sion or use of" marijuana to be eligible for probation. § 13-901.01(A).
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legislature essentially invalidate the initiative through amend
ments.257 However, the people, two years later in 1998, placed on
the ballot and passed the same proposition, this time, with an addi
tional provision barring the legislature from invalidating it again. 258
Proposition 200 illustrates how the popular political participation
mechanisms of referendums and initiatives serve to constrain the
ever-present threat of abusive, unresponsive, or unrepresentative
government. Thus, as the Arizona legislature had to abide by the
clear mandate from its citizens, so should the federal government:
where the citizens of a state have expressed their position on an
issue that falls within the purview of state powers, as Californians
did on the use of medical marijuana, the federal government should
respect the wishes of that state.
b.

Sustaining the American Form of Government

The idea that ours is a government of the people and for the
people exists hand in hand with basic concepts of democracy:
elected officials represent the wishes and needs of the people. 259
As a result of this fundamental principle embedded in the Ameri
can tradition, American people deeply value their right to political
participation in the election of their government representatives.
In this context, American democracy is like a tree whose roots
are the principles of federalism, constantly watered by the electoral
involvement of the people: a tree that, like any other, would wither
absent watering. When the people feel disenfranchised (whether
they are or not is irrelevant), they lose faith in the idea that their
representatives and their government exist by the people and to do
the peoples' work. 260 When this occurs, the populace withdraws
from the political process.
The people may withdraw as a consequence of their distrust in
a government seemingly pursuing its own agendas or driven by ulte
rior motives; or they may withdraw as a result of their disgust with
specific policies or perhaps to demonstrate their disapproval of

cs.

257.

See Tanyanika Samuels, The Pot Prescription, NEWSDAY, Oct. 14, 1997, at

258. See Martin Van Der Werf, Hull Wins, Dems Hold On; Medical Marijuana
Again Has Voter Support, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1998, at AI.
259. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Govern
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.").
260. See SHAPIRO, supra note 240, at 111 (stating that "[t]he political integrity of
a republican form of government ... center[s] on the accountability of elected repre
sentatives to their electorate").
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what they view as unfair or corrupt government conduct,261
Whatever the cause may be, the final result is the same: the popu
lace retreats from political involvement, the government becomes
increasingly less "of the people and for the people," and democracy
and freedom gradually wither away.262
As this erosion progresses, elected officials become increas
ingly detached from their constituencies, and their accountability to
their constituencies diminishes. This process fosters an environ
ment where corruption and special interests preside over trans
parency and legitimacy.263 This road can quickly lead to a
breakdown in the fabric of our free society.264
Perhaps, given enough time, this represents the inescapable
evolution of the American system of government. However, as Jus
tice Brandeis pointed out, our system of federalism derives a great
benefit from "one of its happy incidents": the built-in mechanism of
our laboratories of experimentation, through which the people may
try "novel social and economic experiments."265 The flexibility and
versatility embodied in the laboratories concept, which exists as an
intrinsic part of our dual system of government, is easy to underesti
mate. This vast potential for experimentation in numerous aspects
of American society,266 within the bounds of the Constitution, pro
261. In 2000, approximately 51 % of eligible voters voted in the presidential elec
tion. In 1996, a mere 49% cast their votes, the lowest turn out in over 70 years. In the
1998 congressional election, only 36.4% of the electorate cast its vote, down from 38.8
in 1994. CENTER FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, VOTER TURNOUT, available at www.fair
vote.orglturnout! (last modified Nov. 22, 2002).
262. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of tradi
tional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activ
ities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and
political responsibility would become illusory.")
263. See supra notes 252, 259 and accompanying text.
264. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,386 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
265. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
266. There have been thousands of initiatives, referendums, and recalls in various
States pertaining to numerous issues since the initiative process was first adopted in
1898. BALLOT WATCH, THE HOT ISSUES (1999), at www.ballotwatch.orglhotissues.htm.
For example, in 1998 there were 235 statewide ballot questions on general election bal
lots in 44 states. Of these, 55 were initiatives, 6 popular referendums, and 174 legisla
tive referendums. [d. Of the 235 ballot questions, 160 were constitutional
amendments, 51 were statutes, 15 were bond issues, 6 were popular referendums, two
were non-binding advisory votes, and one was a constitutional convention question. Id.
In total, the voters approved 177 of the 235 statewide ballot questions, a passage rate of
75%. [d.
As examples of the varied issues raised in ballot measures, Maine voters rejected a
partial birth abortion initiative (44%-56%), but approved a medical marijuana initiative
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vides a means to overcome the aforementioned erosion of our free
society and avoids the resulting "serious consequences to the
Nation."267
From time to time, human tendencies or political forces may
lead the government down flawed paths, fueled by unforeseen or
sudden incidents or discoveries, and steered by zealot "patriots"
awaiting the proper environment in which to flourish. However,
armed with our fifty laboratories of societal experimentation, our
system is primed to provide limitless options to limitless predica
ments through innovative approaches to small and large problems
alike. 268 The extent to which an innovative approach would then
propagate throughout our union, from state to state, and the value
that Americans as a people eventually place on it, would be deter
mined solely by the approach's effectiveness as a solution to the
problem at hand. 269 In this sense, it is not surprising that Justice
Brandeis called this feature of our federalist system of government
a "happy incident." It is arguably one of its most important
qualities. 270
Accordingly, when Congress exerts its power over the states
and deliberately overturns the will of a state or its people, its ac
tions should be acceptable and supportable only in light of our "lab
oratories" design. The courts should carefully scrutinize such
congressional action to prevent the erosion of the separation of
powers secured by federalism principles. The legitimacy of the
medical use of marijuana should fall within the purview of these
laboratories of social experimentation, given the health, safety, and
welfare aspects of the issue and the traditional inclusion of these
interests within areas of state responsibility.
The right to a defense of medical necessity should also fall
within the purview of traditional areas of state responsibility be
cause it represents the type of "novel social experiment" that Jus
(61 %-39%); Mississippi voters rejected a state legislator term limits initiative (45%
55%); Alabama voters rejected a legislative referendum to start a state lottery (46%
54 %); Washington state voters approved an initiative to revamp the car registration fee
method (57%-43%); and Washington voters rejected an initiative to ban commercial
net fishing (40%-60%). Id.
267. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
268. Id.
269. Presently, more than 51 million Americans, or approximately 19% of the
U.S. population, live in the eight states where medical marijuana users are protected by
state law. NORML, MEDICAL USE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http//www.
norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=3387 (last updated Dec. 16, 2002).
270. See New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311.
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tice Brandeis considered so worthy of promotion and protection.
Interference by the federal government with persons attempting to
use marijuana for medical purposes in states that have decriminal
ized such action constitutes nothing less than interference with our
laboratories of experimentation.
Medical marijuana, and the use of the medical necessity de
fense in its context, are just two experiments among many going on
today in our "laboratories of societal experimentation." However,
every instance where the federal government inhibits the states' in
herent tendency to serve as laboratories undermines this important
tool and diminishes its effectiveness as a control to the erosion of
our republic. The CSA should not interfere with the use of a de
fense of medical necessity by a seriously ill person who uses mari
juana for medical purposes under Prop 215. In the long run, this
type of federal interference with state law fosters the destruction of
our free and democratic society ~
CONCLUSION

The doctrines of equity and choice of evils, as well as the fun
damental principle of federalism, command the allowance of the
medical necessity defense in cases of use and possession of medical
marijuana. On the basis of these principles, a distinction exists be
tween the enforcement of the CSA where the distribution and man
ufacturing of marijuana is at issue and its enforcement where the
use or possession of marijuana for medical purposes is at issue.
The Supreme Court, in its majority and concurring opinions in
GCBC, identified issues that are relevant regarding that distinction.
Sooner or later, the Supreme Court will likely address the question
of the use or possession of marijuana in violation of the CSA by a
seriously ill patient for whom marijuana is a necessity. When it
does, the Court should allow the use of the medical necessity de
fense because such allowance is required by the doctrines of equita
ble jurisdiction, choice of evils, federalism, and an individual's right
to pain relief. Additionally, such allowance is required by the
Court's prior case law relating to these doctrines; and because such
allowance is not inconsistent with the Court's holding in GCBe.
Miklos Pongratz

